We introduce BPDL, a combination of propositional dynamic logic PDL with the basic four-valued modal logic BK studied by Odintsov and Wansing ('Modal logics with Belnapian truth values', J. Appl. Non-Class. Log. 20, 279-301 (2010)). We modify the standard arguments based on canonical models and filtration to suit the four-valued context and prove weak completeness and decidability of BPDL.
Introduction
Propositional dynamic logic PDL is a well-known logical framework that allows to express properties of regular programs and formalises reasoning about these properties [8, 15] . The framework sees programs as state transitions, or binary relations on states, where states of the computer are viewed as complete and consistent possible worlds. A more general notion of computer state has been put forward by Belnap and Dunn [3, 2, 6] . In a possible world, every formula is either true or false. In a Belnap-Dunn state, formulas can be (only) true, (only) false, both true and false, or neither true nor false. Informally, BelnapDunn states are seen as bodies of information about some domain and the four truth values correspond to presence or absence of information about the domain. More precisely, the four possible truth values of a formula express four possible answers to the query 'What is the available information about ?', namely:
• there is information that is true and no information that is false ('true');
• there is information that is false and no information that is true ('false');
• there is information that is true but also information that is false ('both');
• there is no information about ('neither').
Belnap and Dunn stress the importance of this generalisation to computer science, pointing mainly to databases as a potential area of application. Later work on bilattices, a generalisation of the Belnap-Dunn notion of state, has confirmed their assessment and extended the applications to other areas [12, 11, 1, 9, 10] .
Putting things together, a version of PDL using Belnap-Dunn states would formalise reasoning about regular programs that modify (possibly incomplete and inconsistent) database-like structures. Such structures abound and a logical formalisation of reasoning about their algorithmic transformations could be of vital importance to AI and related areas. In addition to practical applications, theoretical questions pertaining to the properties of such generalised versions of PDL are interesting in their own right. However, Belnap-Dunn versions of PDL are yet to be investigated.
This article fills the gap. We discuss BPDL, a logic that adds program modalities to Odintsov and Wansing's [16] basic modal logic with Belnapian truth values BK (see also [17, 18] ). Our main technical results concerning BPDL (introduced in Section 3 of the article) are a decidability proof using a variation of the standard argument based on filtration (Section 4) and a sound and weakly complete axiomatisation (Section 5). We assume familiarity with PDL, but a short overview of BK is provided in Section 2.
We note that there are other well-known four-valued modal logics, but there are reasons to favour BK when it comes to combinations with PDL. Priest's basic modal First-Degree-Entailment K FDE [19] lacks a sensible implication connective (e.g., Modus ponens fails), which is a problem given the importance of implication in stating properties of programs such as partial correctness. Goble's KN4 [13] corresponds to a fragment of BK. The framework of Rivieccio, Jung and Jansana [20] is more complicated than BK in that it treats the modal accessibility relation itself as many-valued. As a result, for instance, the familiar 'K axiom' 2( ! ) ! (2 ! 2 ) is not valid. This is problematic from the viewpoint of PDL which is a normal modal logic. (However, a non-normal version of PDL built on this framework might still be interesting to look at in the future.) Another approach is to add to PDL a modal DeMorgan negation in the style of [7] . However, the modal negation in this framework does not fit in with implication as nicely as the negation in BK (for instance, ⇠( ! ) does not entail , where '⇠' is the DeMorgan negation). Nevertheless, this approach is pursued by the present author in [21] .
The general idea of providing many-valued versions of PDL is not new. Teheux [22] formulates PDL over finitely-valued Lukasiewicz logics to model the Rényi-Ulam searching game with errors. However, the non-modal fragments of his logics are non-classical, as opposed to BK which can be seen as an extension of the classically-based logic K with a strong negation. Běhounek [4, 5] suggests that PDL with fuzzy accessibility relations is suitable for reasoning about costs of program executions, but the states in his models remain classical.
Modal logic with Belnapian truth values
This section provides background on BK and motivates our extension of the logic with program modalities. The language L mod consists of AF , a countable set of atomic formulas, a nullary connective ?, unary connectives ⇠, 2, 3 and binary connectives^, _, !. ¬ is defined as ! ?, > is defined as ¬? and $ is defined as ( ! )^( ! ). F mod is the set of formulas of L mod .
there is y such that Rxy and y |= (viii) x |= + 3 i↵ there is y such that Rxy and y |= + x |= 3 i↵ for all y, if Rxy, then y |=
Entailment in the resulting logic, BK, is defined as |= + -preservation in every state of every model (X |= BK i↵, for all M ,
States x 2 S can be seen as database-like bodies of information. The fact that x |= + can then be read as 'x provides information that is true' (or 'x supports ', 'x verifies ') and x |= as 'x provides information that is false' ('x falsifies '). Consequently, | | + is seen as the set of states in which is true (the truth set of ) and | | as the set of states in which is false (falsity set). Entailment then boils down to the usual notion of truth-preservation. The distinguishing feature of the Belnap-Dunn picture is that some bodies of information x may support conflicting information about some (if x |= + and x |= ) and some bodies of information x may not provide any information about some at all (if x 6 |= + and x 6 |= ). In other words, | | + and | | may have a non-empty intersection and their union is not necessarily identical to S.
The two negations '⇠' and '¬' can be explained as follows. The formula ⇠ may be read as ' is false' (as x |= + ⇠ i↵ x |= ). On the other hand, the formula ¬ is read as ' is not true' (note that x |= + ! ? i↵ x 6 |= + ). In general, neither ⇠ ! ¬ nor ¬ ! ⇠ are valid. In other words, the present framework treats 'false' and 'not true' as two independent notions. The presence of '⇠' and '¬' in our language allows to express the four possible Belnapian truth values of a formula :
• ^¬⇠ ( is only true, i.e., true and not false);
• ¬ ^⇠ ( is only false, i.e., not true and false);
• ^⇠ ( is both true and false);
• ¬ ^¬⇠ ( is neither true nor false). (ii) Strong negation axioms:
) and the Necessitation rule /2 ; (iv) Modal interaction principles:
Proof. See [16] .
2
The logic BK enjoys the deduction theorem in the sense that |= i↵ |= ! .
2 An interesting feature of BK is that the set of valid formulas is 2 Proof: 6 |= ! i↵, for some x, x 6 |= + ! i↵, for some x, x |= + and x 6 |= + i↵ 6 |= .
not closed under the Replacement rule $ / ( ) $ ( ).
3 However, it is closed under the Positive replacement rule $ / ( ) $ ( ) for ⇠-free and the Weak replacement rule ( $ )^(⇠ $ ⇠ )/ ( ) $ ( ). (See [16] for details.) Schemas ( ^⇠ ) ! ? and _ ⇠ are not valid (but, of course, ( ^¬ ) ! ? and _ ¬ both are).
Languages interpreted over bilattices often contain two additional binary connectives '⌦' and ' '. Their meaning can be outlined by the following example using the reading of the four Belnapian truth values as subsets of the set of 'classical' values {true, false}. If is only true and is only false (the value of is {true} and the value of is {false}), then ⌦ is neither true nor false ({true} \ {false} = ;) whereas is both true and false ({true}[{false} = {true, false}). 4 Odintsov and Wansing [16] do not use these connectives in the modal setting and, for the sake of simplicity, we omit them as well. We note, however, that there is no technical obstacle in introducing them to the framework and, speaking in terms of informal interpretation, they fit in nicely also to our combination of BK with PDL.
Let us now return to the informal interpretation of BK. If states in the model are seen as database-like bodies of information, then the accessibility relation can be construed as any binary relation between such bodies of information. Interpretations related to transformations of such bodies (adding or removing information, for example) are a natural choice. For instance, with a set of available transformations in mind, we may read Rxy as 'y is the result of transforming x in some available way'. 3 then means that there is an available transformation of the present body of information that leads to being supported and 2 means that all available transformations lead to being supported. Hence, BK can be seen as a general formalism for reasoning about such transformations.
This reading of R invites us to generalise the framework to a multi-modal setting. We may want to distinguish between di↵erent types of transformation and so we may need R i for each type i instead of a single relation R. The corresponding formulas of a multi-modal extension of L mod , 2 i (3 i ), would then express that is supported after every (some) transformation of type i. With a number of basic types at hand, the natural next step is to introduce complex transformations consisting of transformations of the basic types. This brings us to extending BK with program operators provided by PDL, i.e., choice, composition, iteration and test. Additional motivation for considering a combination of PDL with BK is given by the following examples. ( 1) read 'If is true and there is no information that is false, then infer that is true'. Such a default rule may be expressed by
a formula that reads 'If is true and is not false, then every terminating execution of ↵ leads to a state where true'. If (2) holds in a state, then executing the program ↵ in the state is equivalent to using (1) in the state. Hence, (1) and ↵ are 'locally equivalent' in the given state. Moreover, if
holds in a state, then (1) and ↵ are ' -equivalent', or locally equivalent in every state reachable by a finite iteration of . Formulas of the form (2) may even be seen as defining ↵ to be a counterpart of a specific default rule. On this view, it is natural to focus only on models where (2) holds in every state (is valid). This motivates a notion of global consequence to be introduced below.
Example 2.4 A special case of (1) is the closed-world assumption rule
inferring that is false from the assumption that is not known to be true. Applications of (3) says that there is inconsistent information about in the present state, but the inconsistency is removed after some finite number of executions of ↵. In other words, ↵ is a -inconsistency-removing modification. Again, we may see the above formulas as defining the respective programs to be counterparts of specific modifications of states.
BPDL
The language L dyn is a variant of the language of PDL, containing two kinds of expressions, namely, programs P and formulas F : ⇤ (the converse inclusion is not assumed) such that
and
In dynamic Odintsov-Wansing models, ? tests whether is true. Hence, test ? executes successfully in two cases: if is only true and if is both true and false. However, if a more precise assessment of is needed, one can use ( ^¬⇠ )? and ( ^⇠ )?.
Lemma 3.2 All the H(BK)
Proof. The proofs are virtually identical to arguments used in the context of standard PDL [15] . As an example, we show that [
, then there are y, z such that R(↵)xy, R(↵ ⇤ )yz and
It is plain that compactness fails for BPDL for the same reason as for PDL [15, 181] . Every finite subset of
).
Examples 2.3 -2.5 suggest that some L dyn -formulas can be seen as definitions of specific features of programs (↵ represents a default rule, ↵ removes inconsistency in the information about a specific formula, etc.). Global consequence is a natural notion here. If X is a set of such definitions, then X |= g i↵ is valid in every model that respects the definitions 'globally'. In other words, is a consequence of the assumption that the definitions in X are satisfied in every possible state. Similarly as in the case of PDL (see [15, 209] , global consequence for finite X corresponds to validity of specific formulas. Proposition 3.4 Let {a 1 , . . . , a n } be the set of all atomic programs appearing in some formula in (finite) X or in . Then 
Decidability
In this section we establish decidability of the satisfiability problem of L dyn formulas in (standard and non-standard) dynamic Odintsov-Wansing models. We modify the standard technique using filtration trough the Fischer-Ladner closure of a formula. Our definition of the Fisher-Ladner closure is a simplified version of the definition used in [15] . 
F L( ) and F L( ) is closed under subformulas;
• variants of the above conditions with all '[·]' replaced by 'h·i'.
Lemma 4.2 For all , F L( ) is finite.
Proof. Standard argument, see [14] . 2 Definition 4.3 Let T be a set of formulas and M a (standard or non-standard) model with x, y 2 S. Let x ⌘ T y i↵, for all 2 T ,
Relations |= + MT , |= MT and R T (↵) for complex ↵ are defined as in standard models.
It is plain that M T is a standard model. We write 
[y] and x |= h↵i only if y |= ;
Proof. A simple but tedious variation of the standard proof using simultaneous induction on the subexpression relation [14, 15] . Details of some of the steps are given in Appendix A. 
Proof. Standard inductive argument, we state only three cases explicitly. Firstly, |⇠ | c = {X | ⇠⇠ 2 X} and, as $ ⇠⇠ is an axiom, this set is identical to {X | 2 X}, i.e., to | | Proof. We need to be establish that R satisfies the conditions required by the definition of a non-standard model. The argument for [, ;, ? and the iteration equations (4) - (7) is virtually identical to that given by [15, p.206-8] . To show
by the same axiom for all 1  k < n and, hence,
Since BPDL is not compact, it cannot enjoy a strongly complete axiomatisation (as BK does). However, weak completeness is another story.
Theorem 5.4 is provable in H(BPDL)
i↵ is valid in BPDL. Proof. Soundness follows from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. Completeness follows from Lemmas 4.5 and 5.3. If is not provable, then X 2 |¬ | + c for some m.c. set X. By the Filtration Lemma, (M c ) F L(¬ ) is a standard model such that [X] 2 |¬ | + F L(¬ ) . 2
Conclusion
This article introduced BPDL, a combination of propositional dynamic logic PDL with the four-valued Belnapian modal logic BK. The logic is expected to be useful in formalising reasoning about the properties of algorithmic transformations of possibly incomplete and inconsistent database-like bodies of information. We modified the standard proofs based on filtration and the canonicalmodel technique and, as the main technical results of the article, established decidability of BPDL and provided it with a sound and weakly complete axiomatisation. The main message here is that the standard techniques are easily adapted to the four-valued setting. The number one topic for future research is the complexity of the satisfiability problem for BPDL. The problem is EXPTIME -complete for PDL and it will be interesting to see whether the situation gets worse in the case of BPDL. Our strategy of tackling the problem will be, as for the results already achieved, to try to adapt the proof technique used in the case of PDL to the four-valued setting. We shall also investigate Belnapian versions of some extensions of PDL. The obvious choice is the first-order dynamic logic DL, but also concurrent PDL modelling parallel execution of programs. Last but not least, a more thorough examination of possible applications of BPDL will be an interesting enterprise.
A Proof of the Filtration Lemma
The proof is a variation of the standard proof using simultaneous induction on the subexpression (subformula or subprogram) relation [14, 15] . In proving the claim of any item (i)-(vii) for any special case of ↵ or , we assume that all the items hold for all subexpressions of ↵ and . Only some steps of the proof are explicitly stated here (and, perhaps, in more detail than an expert reader needs).
is the reflexive transitive closure of R( ), there are z 0 , . . . , z n such that z 0 = x, z n = y and either n = 0 or else
is a subexpression of ⇤ , so, in both cases, we may apply the induction hypothesis (IH):
is a subexpression of [ ?] (h ?i ) and a formula, so we may apply the IH of (vi): Lemma 3.3(iv) . Assume n > 0. We prove that
by induction on k. If k = 0, then the claim follows from the assumption
Assume that the claim holds for k = l. We prove that it holds for k = l + 1 as well. The assumption is that
. is a subexpression of
⇠ by Lemma 3.2. By Lemma 3.3(iv), y |= + ⇠ . Hence, y |= . Next, assume that n > 0. We prove that
by induction on k. If k = 0, then the claim follows from the assumption h ⇤ i 2 F L( ). Assume that the claim holds for k = l. We prove that it holds for k = l + 1 as well. The assumption is that x |= h ⇤ i entails z l |= h ⇤ i . By Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3(iv), z l |= h ih ⇤ i . is a subexpression of ⇤ , so we may use the IH to infer z l+1 |= h ⇤ i . This proves (A.2). Assume that
] for 0  i < n. If n = 0, then the reasoning is similar as in the above cases. Hence, assume that n > 0. We prove that
by induction on k. The case k = 0is trivial. Assume that the claim holds for k = l. We prove that it holds for k = l + 1 as well. The assumption is that z n |= entails z n l |= [ ⇤ ] . There are two possibilities. Either (a)
. is a subexpression of ⇠ , so we may use IH of (vii): and infer
. In fact, this case requires to introduce item (vii) into the Filtration Lemma.
(vi), 
Recall that [·] is given by some specific finite setF L( ) of formulas. For any [z] F L( ) , define X [z] to be the smallest set of formulas such that, for all 2 F L( ):
• If z |= + , then 2 X [z] ;
• If z 6 |= + , then ¬ 2 X [z] .
(Note that we are using '¬' not '⇠'.) Obviously, X [z] is finite for all z. Define
It is not hard to show that, for all w 2 S, w |= It is not hard to show that E defines E, i.e., for all w 2 S w 2 E () w |= (ii) Strong negation axioms:
> $ ⇠?;
